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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CoNTRACTs-IIisxAijTY-IABnIaTY OF ATTORNEYS FOR TRusTEE IN BANKRUPTCY UNDER A CONTRACT TO Fnx AND RAVB
ALwwED ACCOUNTANTS'

CLAIM AGAINST THE BANKRUPT ESTATE

FOR SERVICES RENDERED WITHOUT COURT ORDER AS REQUIRED BY
1
BANKRUPTCY RuLE.--In Chesnutt v. Schwartz, a recent Illinois

Appellate Court case, the defendants were appointed to serve as
attorneys for the trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent lumber
corporation. Subsequently, the trustee was directed by the court
to employ the plaintiffs in the capacity of accountants to aid in
objecting to claims of the United States collector of internal revenue against the bankrupt estate.
Shortly thereafter, the wife of the president of the bankrupt
corporation filed a claim for $95,000, allegedly loaned by her to
the corporation. The defendants, on behalf of the trustee, filed
an objection to the allowance of the claim, and induced the
-1 293 Ill. App. 414, 12 N. E. (2d) 912 (1938).
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plaintiffs to examine and audit the corporate books for the purpose of assisting in the defense to said claim. In return, the defendants promised to file the plaintiff's claim for the fair and
reasonable value of their services and to see that it would be
allowed and satisfied without the necessity of securing an additional order of the court empowering the trustee to employ the
plaintiffs in connection with said claim. In accordance with the
agreement, the plaintiffs procured the information and data necessary in resisting the allowance and payment of the wife's claim,
and as a result of their efforts, it was changed from a preferred
to a general one, and thereby reduced about one-half.
. The plaintiffs duly submitted a bill for the fair and reasonable
value of their services, and the defendants, by failing to present
the plaintiff's claim to have it allowed, breached their agreement.
Having no recourse against the estate, which had been closed after
final distribution, the plaintiffs seek to hold the defendants liable
for the reasonable value of services rendered pursuant to the
agreement.
The sole contention of the defendants is that the contract is
"null and void as against public policy, because of its tendency
to interfere with the impartial administration of justice" in that
it is in contravention of the United State Supreme Court General
Order in Bankruptcy number 45,2 which reads as follows: "No
auctioneer or accountant shall be employed by a receiver or trustee except upon an order of the court expressly fixing the amount
of the compensation or the rate or measure thereof."
The court stated that the statute referred to is not in point as
it specifically designates that receivers and trustees are so restricted, and the defendants are neither, but are attorneys who
agreed on their own behalf to have the plaintiff's fee for services
allowed by the bankruptcy court. Even if the statute is applicable, the plaintiffs should recover, for illegality does not always
have the effect of voiding a contract for all purposes.3 Thus a
contract may, because of the status or conduct of one party, be
unenforceable by him and yet capable of being enforced by the
other party.
In the instant case the purpose of the statute involved undoubt2 11 U. S. C. A. § 53, Order XIV.
3 Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 2 S. Ct. 408, 27 L. Ed. 682 (1883) ; In
re Sylvester's Estate, 195 Iowa 1329, 192 N. W. 442, 30 A. L. R. 180 (1923) ;
Fox v. Petty, 235 Ky. 240, 30 S. W. (2d) 945 (1930) ; Vercellini v. U. S. I.
Realty Co., 158 Minn. 72, 196 N. W. 672 (1924) ; Groves v. Jones, 252 Mich.
446, 233 N. W. 375 (1930): Horticultural Development Co. v. Schneider,
225 Ala. 667, 145 So. 135 (1932) ; Davis v. Smoot, 176 N. C. 538, 97 S. E.
488 (1918).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

edly is to preserve the bankrupt estate against depletion from unnecessary administration expenses, and the purpose would not be
violated in holding the defendants liable for breach of contract.
If the plaintiffs had made a contract intending that the attorneys
make an unlawful raid on the bankrupt estate, then there is no
doubt the plaintiffs should not recover. Here, however, the agreement was not one inherently wrong, and the intent of the plaintiffs was apparently lawful. That the object to be accomplished
was meritorious is apparent from the fact that, as a result of the
plaintiffs' efforts, an unjust claim was greatly reduced, to the
benefit of the estate.
The statute concerned does not forbid and, in fact, specifically
authorizes such employment, and the fact that the defendants
contracted to procure the necessary legal sanction does not make
the contract illegal even though they were not in a position to
control the sanction. 4 The contract is illegal, if at all, only because of not being authorized in the manner prescribed by a rule
of court, and not because of being against public policy or because
of involving moral turpitude. 5 Therefore, as any illegality involved would be only as to the defendants' method of executing
their part of the agreement, and, as a lawful method of performance was possible, a recovery should be allowed ;"this is especially
true when we consider that the defendants are attorneys familiar
with bankruptcy practice and proceedings, and the plaintiffs are
accountants
who relied upon the attorneys' knowledge of the
7
law.

The court logically decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to
the relief sought. That no other result could have been reached
4 Lamb v. Tomlinson, 261 Ill. 388, 103 N. E. 1058 (1913), affirming 77 Ill.
App. 290; Crichfield v. Bermudez Asphalt Pay. Co., 174 Ill. 466, 51 N. E.
552, 42 L. R. A. 347 (1898) ; Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147, 158 S. W.
577 (1913) ; 13 C. J. 440, n. 18.
5 Tallman v. Lewis, 124 Ark. 6, 186 S. W. 296 (1916); Moss v. Cohen,
158 N. Y. 240, 53 N. E. 8 (1899); Warren v. Bouvier, 124 N. Y. S. 641
(1910) ; Gray v. Leggitt, 169 N. Y. S. 311 (1918). It is interesting to note
that the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum is repudiated in some jurisdictions. Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362, 122 N. W.
1 (1909).
6 Josephs v. Briant, 108 Ark. 171, 157 S. W. 136 (1913) ; Fox v. Rogers,
171 Mass. 546, 50 N. E. 1041 (1898) ; Favor v. Philbrick, 7 N. H. 326
(1834). The general principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse for
violating that law is not applicable where the performance of the agreement in
the manner intended would be illegal, but a legal method of performance is
possible.
7 An attorney is bound to conduct himself as a fiduciary or trustee occupying the highest position of trust and confidence and is duty-bound to exercise
the utmost good faith, honesty, integrity, fairness, and fidelity. People v.
Kwasigroch, 296 Ill. 542, 130 N. E. 344 (1921) ; People v. Charone, 288 111.
220, 123 N. E. 291 (1919) ; 7 C. J. S. §125, note 44.
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cannot be denied, for a refusal to allow the plaintiffs a recovery
would not only be wholly out of proportion to the requirements
of public policy,8 but would also interfere with the impartial administration of justice, which is the very thing the defendants,
themselves, contend should not be countenanced.
E. B. MILLER
CONTRACTS RESTRAINING

RESTRAINT OF TRADE -

VENDOR OF

VALIDITY OF COVENANT

VACANT LOT FROM COMPETING

WITH

VENDEE IN A BUSINESS PREVIOUSLY BOUGHT FROM VENDOR.-

Tuzik v. Lukes,' a case recently decided in the Illinois Appellate
Court, brought forth a novel situation in which the doctrine of
reasonable partial restraint was successfully applied. The facts
show that in 1931 the defendants had sold their bakery shop to
the plaintiffs, retaining ownership of the vacant lot next door;
and that the plaintiffs purchased this lot in 1933. In conjunction
with the latter sale defendants agreed to refrain from entering
into the bakery business either as principals or employees for a
period of ten years within a radius of one mile from the plaintiffs'
bakery. In 1937 defendants breached this agreement by entering
the employ of a baker one block away. Plaintiffs filed their bill
for an injunction which was dismissed for want of equity.
Against the contention of the defendants that this stipulation
was void, because not incident to and in support of a contract of
sale of some interest in a business which the instrument was designed to protect, the appellate court reversed and remanded the
decision, saying that in view of all circumstances, including the
previous sale of the business and the business interests of the
plaintiffs, the sale of property adjacent thereto was sufficient to
sustain the covenant.
The general rule as regards reasonableness of restraint is stated
in the case of Pelc v. Kulentis,2 which was cited and relied on in
the instant case. Statements to similar effect can be found in the
bulk of the Illinois decisions dealing with restraint of trade,3 but
Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 274, 11 N. E. (2d) 908 (1937).
1 293 Ill. App. 297, 12 N. E. (2d) 233 (1938).
2 "Considered with reference to the situation, business and objects of the
parties, and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances with reference
to which the contract was made, if the restraint contracted for appears to
have been for a just and honest purpose, for the protection of the legitimate
interests of the party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between
them, and not injurious to the public, the restraint will be held valid." 257
Ill. App. 213 (1930).
3 Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577 (1899);
Lanzit v. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 Ill. 326, 56 N. E. 393 (1900) ; Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill. 420, 61 N. E. 1038 (1901) ; Rugg v. Rohrbach,
8
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it might be noted that in all of these decisions the restraint was
imposed at a time when a business, business good will, or business
property was sold. Thus the Tuzik case would seem to extend the
application of the rule in Illinois, and fit into the first of the five
major classes of valid covenants outlined by Justice Taft in
United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Company.4 Although
the facts are different, a recent case in the Appellate Court of
Indiana5 applied the general rule with an opposite result. In that
case several years after dissolution of the partnership, the former
partners contracted to secure registration of a trade name, and a
covenant was inserted that one of them should not operate a retail
shoe business within a certain area. This restraint was held invalid because not ancillary to the main purpose of the contract,
or necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the
fruits thereof.
A few states in which similar situations have arisen have statutory declarations which preclude the making of a restraining covenant unless ancillary to the sale of a business or some substantial
interest therein.0
As the question of reasonableness of restraint is one of law for
the court under the particular facts of the case7 it seems safe to
assume that evidence not included in the report of the case was
persuasive to the end of holding the restraint in question valid.
The court in its opinion says, "The law is as stated by defendants,
but in passing upon the validity of this agreement we must consider all the facts presented." In view of language in the Union
Strawboard Company case s and in Pelc v. Kulentis9 the present
decision would seem to be a reasonable extension of the doctrine
of reasonable restraint. However, no cases have been found in
states not having a statutory declaration which have presented
an agreement in restraint of trade in connection with the mere
sale of real property. But, in cases where a sale of personal property is made, and a restraint imposed upon the seller, an analo110 Ill. App. 532 (1903) ;Pelc v. Kulentis, 257 Ill. App. 213 (1930), and
cases cited therein.
4 85 F. 271, 46 L. R. A. 123 (1898).
The first of the five classes is
stated, "By the seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer
in such a way as to derogate from the value of the property or business
sold."
5 Milgram v. Milgram, 12 N. E. (2d) 394 (Ind. App., 1938).
6 California, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma; see Prescott
v. Bidwell, 18 S. D. 64, 99 N. W. 93 (1904).
7 Lanzit v. J. W. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 I1. 326, 56 N. E. 393 (1900);
Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N. E. 868 (1933).
8 193 Ill. 420, 61 N. E. 1038 (1901).
9 257 Ill. App. 213 (1930).
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gous situation is presented. Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of
Cin cinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy and Pomeroy Packet Company v. Bay,l 0 where a restraint was imposed on the seller of
barges, vessels, coal flats, and stock, not to engage in the shipping
business, stated, "It is said that there is no sale of good will. But
the covenant makes the sale. Presumably all that there was to
sell, .

. was the competition itself . .

."

Thus, property which

is adapted to a specific kind of business can be said to carry with
it the presumption of use in such business, and that a restraint
imposed upon the seller if reasonable in view of the circumstances
and objects of the parties is valid." Thus the Tuzik case cannot
be taken for the view that mere sale of real property is sufficient
to sustain such a restraint of trade, for the court in rendering its
decision looked to all the circumstances-mainly the previous sale
of the business.
Thus, the only question decided was one of fact, and, although the facts were novel, the decision is in accord with the
tenor of previous decisions. At common law the reasons for voiding contracts in restraint of trade are twofold: first, because the
covenanter is denied the pursuit of his livelihood, without a corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and, second, because it
tends to monopoly, a detriment to the public.12 Neither of these
reasons for invalidating the restraint appears in the present case.
A. A. KREUTER
CORPORATIONS -

AMENDMENT

TO CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORA-

TION-ABROGATION OF ACCRUED DrVDENDS ON CUMULATIVE PRE-

1
FERRED STOCK.-In Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson,
plaintiff sought to enjoin the corporation from filing an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, which attempted, among
other things, to abrogate the right of holders of cumulative preferred stock to receive dividends accrued by passage of time. The
amendment was sought to be made under the Delaware corporation law,2 which permitted amendment of the certificate of incorporation "by increasing or decreasing its authorized capital
stock or reclassifying the same, by changing the number, par
value, designations, preferences, or relative, participating, op-

tional. or other special rights of the shares ...

1o 200 U. S. 179, 26 S. Ct. 208, 50 L. Ed. 428 (1905).

."

The question

31 Gamewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35 N. E. 98
(1893).
12 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
1 197 A. 489 (Del., 1937).
2 Rev. Code 1915, § 1940, as amended by 35 Del. Laws, Ch. 85, § 10.
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presented was whether the corporation had the power to alter or
extinguish, as an incident to the proposed reclassification of its
capital structure, the right of preferred stockholders to receive
accumulated dividends accrued on their shares through passage
of time, but not declared.
It was contended on behalf of the corporation that the right of
the shareholders to such dividends was merely an expectant or
contingent right to receive accumulated dividends, because the
rights of the stockholders were, by express provisions of the
charter, made subject to the reserved power of amendment by the
corporation.
The Delaware court held that while the shareholders did take
their stock subject to the power of the corporation to amend or
alter the character and priorities of their stock, their right to
receive accrued and unpaid back dividends is a fixed contract
right which may not be abrogated without their consent and that
the shareholders had agreed to be subject to the amending power
only from the date of the amendment forward. The statute,
therefore, was held to have no retrospective effect.
The question presented in the principal case is of compelling
interest in this state because Section 52(g) of the Illinois Business Corporation Acts may give rise to a like problem.
Under facts substantially similar to those in the principal case
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Harr v.
Pioneer Mechanical Corporation,4 construed the same statute involved in the Consolidated Film case as authorizing alterations
of past due dividends which had accrued by passage of time only.
In this case the right to receive such dividends was regarded by
the court as included within the amending power as to "relative,
participating, optional, or other special rights of the shares." The
court holds that purchasers of cumulative preferred shares buy
them with the right of amendment in mind and must be held to
have weighed that disadvantage in making the purchase.
The Harr case was followed in Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug
Corporation,5 which denied the right of holders of cumulative
preferred stock to receive accrued dividends before any dividends
8 "A corporation may amend its articles of incorporation, from time to
time....
"(g) To change the designation of all or any part of its shares, whether
issued or unissued, and to change the preferences, qualifications, limitations,
restrictions, and the special or relative rights in respect of all or any part
of its shares, whether issued or unissued." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Chapter 32,
§ 157.52.
4 65 F. (2d) 332 (1933) ; certiorari denied, 290 U. S. 673, 54 S. Ct. 92,
78 L. Ed. 581 (1933).
5 95 F. (2d) 172 (1938).
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could be paid upon new stock issued pursuant to an amendment
of the charter.
Keller v. Wilson & Company0 presented a situation wherein
the corporation attempted to abrogate the right of cumulative preferred shares to accrued dividends by virtue of an amendment to
the corporation law enacted subsequent to the creation of the
corporation. Here the Delaware court held the right to such dividends, as between the shareholders, to be a presently vested right,
the enjoyment of which was postponed, and the proposed amendment to the articles of incorporation void.
Likewise in New York it has been held that a holder of cumulative preferred stock, the number of whose shares had been reduced pursuant to a recapitalization, was entitled to be paid
dividends accrued prior to recapitalization on the number of
shares held prior thereto before any dividends could be paid on
common stock out of surplus earned subsequent to such recapitalization. The court there held that while the preferred shareholders are not creditors of the corporation in a technical sense, as
between themselves and other shareholders they were creditors,
entitled to be fully paid as to arrears in dividends before any
surplus profits could be appropriated to the new common stock.7
The different light in which the right here under consideration
is regarded is responsible for the division of authorities heretofore noted. Those cases, of which the principal case is representative, seem to indicate that until the time of amendment to articles
of incorporation changing participating rights of holders of
cumulative preferred shares in corporate surplus, the right of
such shareholders to dividends theretofore accruing is a fixed
contract right, the enjoyment thereof being postponed until the
creation of a fund out of which they may be paid and the declaration of the dividend.8 This right is deemed fixed by their contract and any amendment which seeks to alter the extent or mode
6

190 A. 115 (Del., 1936).

7 Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13, 3 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1034, 6 Ann. Cas. 213 (1906). On June 25, 1904, the capital stock
of defendant corporation was reduced apparently in accord with vote of
its stockholders. Plaintiff voted against such measure but thereafter exchanged her certificate for 250 shares of cumulative preferred stock for 166
shares of the same class. In December, 1904, the corporation declared a
dividend for both common and preferred stock, based, however, on the
number of shares outstanding after the capitalization. Plaintiff claimed to be
entitled to accrued dividends up to the date of recapitalization on the number of shares held by her up to such time.
8 Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (1929);
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923)
Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J.
Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (1927).
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of their participation in surplus can speak only from the time of
amendment forward. On the other hand, the Harr and Ainsworth
cases regard that right as merely a special privilege or preference
of the shares and hence subject to change in accordance with the
reservation of the power of amendment.
B. P. MORISSETTE
CORPORATIONS FORECLOSURE OF TRUST DEEDS POWER OF
TRUSTEE TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF BONDHOLDERS.-In the recent

case of Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Chief Wash Company,1 defaults had existed in the payment of the principal
maturities due June 1 and December 1, 1933, and June 1, 1934,
and of interest installments on the dates specified. The payment
of taxes was likewise in arrears. The bond issue was secured by
a trust in the nature of a mortgage upon real estate improved by
a building used solely by the defendant in the operation of its
laundry business. Rents, issues, and profits were also pledged to
secure the bonds. The mortgage provided that upon default in
the payment of interest the trustee could in its own discretion,
or upon the written request of the holders of not less than twentyfive per centum of the outstanding bonds, accelerate the entire
issue and foreclose the trust deed. In June, 1934, defendant
Chief Wash Company wrote the trustee, stating that in view of
negotiating an extension plan eighty per centum of the outstanding bonds had been deposited with said defendant, that since the
trustee was not required to foreclose unless the holders of twentyfive per centum of the outstanding bonds demanded such action
it was obvious that no such demand could be made, and that if
the trust company proceeded to foreclose it would do so at its
own risk. The trustee, nevertheless, filed a complaint to foreclose the trust deed. Counterclaim was then filed to remove the
trustee and to recover damages for wrongful institution of the
foreclosure suit.
The unusual feature of this case was that, while eighty per
centum of the bondholders sought to stay the foreclosure proceedings, not a single bondholder requested that the trustee accelerate the maturity of the bonds. The case is also unusual because, while the usual complaint of bondholders is that the
trustee has been guilty of failing to act to protect the rights or
the property of the security holders, here the trust company was
more concerned with marshalling the assets for the cestuis que
trust than were the bondholders themselves. The court upheld
1 368 Ill. 146, 13 N. E. (2d)

153 (1938).
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this apparent overzealousness on the part of the trustee by holding that it was trying to protect the interest of the minority bondholders and had not shown an abuse of discretion.
The ordinary duty of a trustee is "to protect and preserve the
subject of the trust, being authorized, for that purpose, to invoke
the aid of the courts in a proper case .
"...1,2
The rule in Illinois
and elsewhere is that the care and prudence to be exercised by the
trustees is that which ordinary men would exercise in like circumstances in connection with their own affairs. a Generally
speaking, the trustee represents the bondholders, and the latter
are usually not permitted to intervene in any action begun by
the trustee.4 Since it holds legal title, the trustee, not the bondholders, is patently the proper party to institute foreclosure proceedings. Ordinarily it is in the trustee's discretion to determine
when it shall do so,5 but it is the trustee's duty to act in good
6
faith.
Nor is the action by a trust company against the apparent desires of a majority of the bondholders without support in our
courts. A Federal court 7 has held that a trustee could sue to foreclose, despite opposition of a majority of the bondholders, on the
theory that the trustee cannot blindly submit to the domination
of the majority and that such majority has no right to employ the
voting power as an instrument by which the rights of the minority shall be injuriously affected.
At first blush such a holding might seem to be quite illogical.
if the trustee is acting in behalf of the bencficiarics, -wh
-y should
his own opinion not give precedence to the voice of the holders of
a majority of the bonds? The only answer to this is that it would
defeat the very purpose for which the trustee was selected. Let
us suppose that in a similar case one party owned sixty per
2 41 C. J. 606, par. 571.
Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill.
484, 115 N. E. 618 (1917).
Louis S. Posner, "Liability of the Corporate Trustee," 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 198 at 230; Amer. Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. 180 E. Delaware Bldg.
Corp., 262 Ill. App. 67 (1931).
5 Louis S. Posner, "The Trustee and Trust Indenture," 46 Yale L.
Journal 737 at 766. However, see Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon
St. Corp., 263 N. Y. S.359 (1933), which held that, even after foreclosure
proceedings have been instituted, they may be enjoined at suit by dissenting
bondholders for time to investigate a reorganization plan pursuant to which
foreclosure suit was instituted.
6 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed., Rochester, N. Y.: Lawyer's
Co-operative Pub. Co., 1918) III, 2426, § 1061.
7 Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 67 F. 168 (1894) ; Hollister
v. Stewart, 111 N. Y. 644, 19 N. E. 782 (1889), affirming 37 Hun 645. Here
the court said, "His duty is to bondholders severally, and he is not at liberty
to follow the advice or wishes of the majority, but is always liable to the
minority for a faithful administration of his trust."
3
4
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centum of all the bonds and he, being of a gambling nature and
confronted with the present situation, decided that he would
stake all on the future and refuse to foreclose. Or suppose that
he had some equity in the mortgagor company and might, therefore, deny the trustee the right to take appropriate action to protect the minority's interest. The result in either case would be
that the trustee would be helpless to prevent the latter's interest
from being entirely lost. That is the reason for the rule that the
trustee should represent the minority as well as the majority.
In a recent Idaho case,8 the mortgage stated: "If default shall
be made in the payment of said bonds... the said trustees may,
in their discretion, and shall upon written request of the holders
of a majority in amount of said outstanding bonds.., take immediate steps for the foreclosure of this mortgage. .

.

. It is

further agreed that any such suit or action shall be subject to
the control of such majority in amount of the bondholders, and
it shall be lawful at any time before sale of the property, for such
majority to direct the trustees in writing to waive such default
or breach and dismiss any suit theretofore brought for the foreclosure of this mortgage." And where the majority attempted to
stop such foreclosure proceedings, the court, in referring to the
8 Poage v. Co-operative Pub. Co., 57 Ida. 561, 66 P. (2d)

1119 (1937).
In Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 at 21 and 23 (1858), the court stated: "But
after the forfeiture occurs either by non-payment of interest or principal,
or both, . . . the duties of the trustees become, not only active and responsible but critical and delicate. It not only is not a dead, dry trust, but is one
of the most active and momentous responsibility. . . . The trustee must then
elect between delay and action; between, on the one hand, taking possession
of the road and its fixtures,... and on the other, delay, and consequent further
embarrassment, complication and loss; or they must undertake the ulterior and
final remedy of foreclosure. . . . They could not consult the entire body of
cestuis que trust, and their duty being due to the bondy severally they were
not at liberty to follow the advice or wishes of the majority, as they were
still liable to the minority for faithful administration. And in showing this,
the advice of the majority would be no more conclusive, in their favor than
that of others, equally skilled and equally interested in the question. Having
assumed the duty of faithful administration of the trust in behalf of the
several owners of the bonds, they were not at liberty to shield themselves
by anything short of showing the fact of such administration, or that they
were excused by the owners' unanimous consent from the performance of
their duty under the trust. They must act without delay, and under the
responsibility of being made liable for a breach of trust, if they failed to
act in time, or to act with proper discretion, wisdom and forecast."
New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co., 193 F. 175 at 180 (1912),
where the court stated, "The trustee, independently of the provisions of the
trust deed, has the power, and it is its duty, whenever the necessity arises, to
invoke the aid of a court of equity to preserve the trust estate, and this
power cannot be abridged or restricted even by agreement of the parties."
Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Green Cove Springs & M. R. Co.,
139 U. S. 137, 11 S. Ct. 512, 35 L. Ed. 116 (1890) ; Bullowa v. Thermoid Co.,
114 N. J. L. 205, 176 A. 596 (1935).
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latter restriction, said: "Clauses of this character, restrictive of
the common-law right of the creditor, who holds a plain obligation of his debtor, are not favored in law, and must be strictly
construed. . . . This provision ...cannot be construed to give
the holders of a majority of the bonds the right to destroy the
security of the minority bondholders or to extend to the point of
releasing or discharging the indebtedness. If it were intended
that such stipulation should grant such an arbitrary power to the
holders of the majority of the bonds, it would be void and a court
of equity would disregard it."
Apparently, then, once the trust agreement gives the trustee
the discretionary right to foreclose the trust deed the courts are
loath to restrict his authority. The fact that in the instant case
the trust company was seeking also to sequester the income and
rents further justified its action. In fact, according to one
authority,9 the trustee "may be guilty of a breach of trust in
failing to commence foreclosure preceedings promptly, especially
where the mortgage, in addition to covering the property, pledges
the income, because the lien on future income attaches only after
it has been impounded by the assertion of the mortgagee's rights,
in some appropriate proceedings."
The failure to pay a single installment of interest being a
breach of the trust deed and the trustee having the right to accelerate the entire issue upon such breach, the instant case does
not show an abuse of discretion on the part of the trustee.

FoRMS AND REQUISITEs - EFFECT OF and/or
CONTAINED IN STATUTES, PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, AND

JUDGMENTs
BEING

CoNTRAcTs.-In Sproule v. Taffe,l the Illinois Appellate Court
reversed a judgment on the ground that the symbol "and/or"
contained therein rendered it void for uncertainty. This is the
first decision in Illinois reversed for this reason, but the result
was forecast as early as 1931 when Mr. Justice O'Connor, who
wrote the opinion in the instant case, strongly criticized the use
2
of the symbol.
9 Silvester E. Quindry, Bonds and Bondholders-Rights and Remedies,
(Chicago: Burdette Smith Co., 1934), I, § 212.
1 294 Il. App. 374, 13 N. E. (2d) 827 (1938). The judgment was by
confession on a written lease which recited that it was between an individual
and/or a corporation and a tenant and the judgment followed the terms of
the lease.
2 In Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers' Union. 260 Ill. App. 435
(1931), Mr. Justice O'Connor stated, "In a close case where these words are
used, a situation may be presented that would warrant this court in reversing
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Because the phrase destroys accuracy, its meaning in each instance being dependent upon the context and circumstances,
courts have often urged that its use be discontinued. Its employment in statutes has been disapproved on the ground that laws
enacted in alternatives are riddles propounded for future solution by the courts and ultimately express the will of the courts
and not that of the legislature.3 Its use in pleadings has been
discouraged for the reason that its presence therein creates uncertainty, whereas good pleading requires averments to be clear
in order that definite issues can be reached. 4 Uncertainty in judgments is tolerated least of all. In the Putnam case, 5 the Supreme
Court of Utah reversed a judgment because the use of the phrase
"and/or" rendered it uncertain.
The use of the symbol in contracts has not been as severely
criticised as when utilized in statutes, pleadings, and judgments.
Such contracts are sustained where a court, in construing the
agreement as a whole, has been able to give effect to the intention
of the parties.6
It should be recognized that the phrase "and/or" does not
always create uncertainty. This may seem inconsistent in view of
the decisions criticizing its use, but the symbol has unquestionably been used innumerable times without causing confusion. In
such cases the court made no comment, as none was necessary.
Consequently, there is some basis for the contention that as a
proposition must sometimes necessarily be stated both ways, the
symbol is properly used when the intention is to express both
views without being prolix, a fault for which attorneys are cona judgment or decree." The symbol has been described by courts and attorneys as "a confusing fad," "accuracy-destroying symbol," "pollution of
the English language," "that barbarism," "unsightly hieroglyphic," and

"verbal teratism."

3 "A Legislature in making its laws . . . must express its own will and

leave nothing to the mere will or caprice of the courts." State v. Dudley,
159 La. 872, 106 S. 364 (1925).
4 Kornbrodt v. Equitable Trust Co., 137 Or. 386, 2 P. (2d) 236 (1931);
6 Encyc. of P1. and Pr. 268. Under any system of practice, pleadings are
bad when they state material facts in the alternative so that it is impossible
to determine upon which of several equally substantial averments the
pleader relies for the maintenance of his action or defense.
5 Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 187, 14 P. (2d) 973 (1932);
Doughty v. Pallissard, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 452 (1938) ; uncertainty in judgments
renders them void, 11 Encyc. of P1. and Pr. 949.
6 Schaffer v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 267 N. Y. S. 551 (1933);
State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925) ; Bobrow v. U. S. Casualty
Co., 246 N. Y. S.363 (1930). This is in effect construing the contract so as
to give it such interpretation as will best accord with the equity of the situation. To do this, courts will give effect to either the conjunction or disjunction or to both.
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stantly criticized. 7 However, while the prolixity of lawyers has
been properly c icized, especially where the use of a symbolic
short-cut causes ,i accuracy and requires litigation in aid of its
construction, no sikh fault can be attributed to an attorniey who
prefers to express alternatives clearly and unequivocallyPI.Soreover, the use of the phrase by legislators and attorneys cafn' ften
be attributed to their indolence and inability and not to a T-';e
8
Itff'
to avoid prolixity.
E. B. MILLER
LICENSES-OCCUPATIONAL SALES TAX-WHETHER A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

IS

WITHIN THE ILLINOIS OCCUPATIONAL

SALES

TAx ACT.-In the recently decided case of Herlihy Mid-Continent Company v. Nudelman,' the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the Illinois Occupational Sales Tax Act 2 was not
applicable to sand, gravel, cement, reinforced steel, and the like
used in performance of contracts made by a contractor with the
Sanitary District of Chicago, whereby the former was to erect
certain concrete sewers and tunnels. The court held that the
transfer did not constitute a retail sale of the building materials,
but that it was a mere incident to the rendition of services, and
as such was not taxable. Mr. Chief Justice Farthing, who wrote
the majority opinion in the Blome case, dissented.
The Director of Finance, to sustain his position that the
transfer of the building materials constituted a taxable retail
sale, relied upon two prior Illinois decisions, namely Bradley
The former case decided that a building contractor resells to the
owner of the completed structure the plumbing supplies and
fixtures which he puts into the structure; and the latter case
decided that a building contractor resells and must pay a sales
tax on such materials as the sand and gravel which he put into
the completed structure. In the instant case, the court expressly
7 18 A. B. A. Jour. 574. B. K. Sandwell in "The Which of And/Or,"
appearing in Harper's for July, 1932, suggests that the symbol has vast possibilities if extended to other fields, giving as an example the symbol for/
against and pointing out how expedient it would be if political candidates
could state they were for/against the issues of the campaign.

8 18 A. B. A. Jour. 456, 574.
1 367 Ill. 600, 12 N. E. (2d) 638 (1937).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, § 440, et seq. Sec. 441 reads, "A tax is
imposed upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property at retail in this State .. " The original act was held invalid in
Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N. E. 113 (1933). The present act was
held valid in Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 I11.
178, 194 N. E. 268

(1934).

272 (1934).
4 365 Ill. 456, 6 N. E. (2d) 841, 111 A. L. R. 940 (1937).
3 359 Ill. 162, 194 N. E.
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overruled the Blome case but distinguished
the Bradley case,
5
which remains good law in Illinois.
It would seem, therefore, that, since the ferlihy decision,
the Illliijis law is now settled that if a building contractor builds
into th. structure certain articles which substantially retain their
identity in the completed structure, such as plumbing supplies and
fixt- res, this constitutes a retail sale of these articles and the
ciwtactor must pay a sales tax thereon. Moreover, the first sale
of these commodities by the supply house to the contractor is not
taxable, since he buys them not for his own use, but for the
purpose of reselling them to the owner of the completed structure. 6 But if, as in the instant case, the contractor, as an incident
to the rendition of his services in erecting the structure, uses
certain building materials which lose their identity in the completed structure, such as sand, gravel, and cement, this does not
constitute a taxable sale of tangible personal property to the
owner of the house as contemplated by the act, and no sales tax
need be paid by the contractor.
In other jurisdictions the commonest method of determining
who should pay the sales tax in such cases is to ascertain whether
a party to the transaction is the ultimate consumer or user of the
goods and, if so, which one.7 But the cases using this test are not
uniform, and there are decisions holding each way.8 Although
5 The point of distinction is that the Bradley case involved materials
which retained their identity in the completed structure, whereas the Blome
and Herlihy cases involve materials which lose their identity in the completed
structures. Moreover, the instant decision in no way jeopardizes the prior
Illinois cases holding that there are taxable sales even though the transfers
are commingled with incidental services. See Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Ames,
360 Ill. 485, 196 N. E. 461 (1935); Swain Nelson & Sons Co. v. Dept. of
Finance, 365 Ill. 401, 6 N. E. (2d) 632 (1937).
6 Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 111. 162, 194 N. E. 272 (1934).
7 Warren v. Fink, 146 Kan. 716, 72 P. (2d) 968 (1937).
For a general
discussion on this point see 34 Col. L. Rev. 809.
8 The courts of Arkansas have held that the owner of the completed
structure is the ultimate user of the building materials which go into the
structure, and hence that the transaction constitutes a taxable retail sale
of the building materials by the contractor to the owner of the structure.
See Wiseman v. Gillioz, 192 Ark. 950, 96 S. W. (2d) 459 (1936). On the
other hand, the courts of Louisiana, Maryland, and Arizona have taken the
view that it is the contractor who is the ultimate user of the building materials as an incident to the rendition of his services, and hence his putting
them into the completed structure is not taxable as a retail sale. See State
v. J. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1935); State v.
Christhilf, 170 Md. 586, 185 A. 456 (1936) ; Moore v. Pleasant Hasler
Construction Co., 76 P. (2d) 225 (Ariz., 1937). It is interesting to note
the history of this last case. The original decision, reported in 72 P. (2d)
573 (Ariz., 1937), held contrary, but the same court reversed itself on
rehearing, and one of the court's reasons for reversal was the fact that the
Blome case, which it had cited as authority for its prior decision, had in the
interim been overruled by the Illinois court, in the Herlihy case.
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the Illinois court does not expressly guide itself, either in the
Blome or Herlihy case, with the aforementioned test, as such, yet
it is always in the background as a determining factor, inasmuch
as the Illinois statute defines a taxable retail sale as one for use
or consumption.9
It should, of course, follow as a necessary corollary of the
Herlihy decision, that, since building materials which do not
retain their identity in the completed structure are used, and
not resold, by the contractor, the sale of these building materials
by the manufacturer or supply house to the contractor is now
taxable as a retail sale, since he purchases them for his own use
and not for resale.' 0 This result has already been reached in
another state."
It is also to be noted that by virtue of a refund clause in the
Illinois act, 12 all contractors who paid sales tax in reliance on
the Blome case, now overruled, can recover these payments, 13
even though no protest was made.
B. FELDMAN
9 It would seem that the recently decided case of Babcock v. Nudelman,
367 Ill. 626, 12 N. E. (2d) 635 (1937), holding an optometrist not subject
to a tax for lenses and frames sold to his patients, loses sight of this aforementioned test. Contra, State Tax Commission v. Hopkins, 243 Ala. 556, 176
So. 210 (1937).
10 This result in no way conflicts with the Bradley case, since the court
distinguishes between the contractor's use of materials which lose their
identity and those which retain their original form. The attitude of the sales
tax department originally, as evidenced by the first code of regulations that
it promulgated, was that the contractor was the ultimate consumer of all
building materials which he used, and hence the department ruled that all
sales by the supply house or manufacturer to the contractor were taxable
as retail sales. The Bradley case, which was instituted to test the validity
of this original regulation, decided against the state and hence resulted in
the entire abandonment of the original regulation. The state evidently believed that the Bradley case was authority for the proposition that the contractor resold (but did not use) all building materials which he incorporated
into the finished structure, and the Department laid down the second order,
that henceforth all sales by the contractor to the owner of the structure
were taxable as a retail sale. While the Illinois court originally sustained
this regulation in the Blome case, as we know now, the Herlihy case
ultimately held this regulation invalid as to transfers of materials which
lost their identity in the completed structure. It would seem, therefore, that
insofar as the materials concerned are such as lose their identity, the
original regulation is now correct; and only insofar as the materials are
such as retain their identity is the second regulation the correct one to apply.
For a general discussion on this point, see 31 Ill. L. Rev. 741.
11 Lone Star Cement Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 234 Ala. 465, 175 So.
399 (1937).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, § 445: "If it shall appear that an amount
of tax, penalty or interest has been paid which was not due under the provisions of this Act, whether as the result of a mistake of fact or an error of
law . . . such amount shall be refunded to such person by the department."
13 It would seem that the converse of this proposition should also be true,

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BUILDING REGULATIONS-WHETBFER
TAKING IN PAYING GUESTS CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF ZONiNG

ORDINANCE.-In the case of Re Rex v. Roulet' it was held -that
defendant's practice of taking in paying guests constituted a
violation of a zoning ordinance of the City of Toronto, which
forbade the use of premises within the restricted zone for any
purpose other than as a "detached private residence.?' The
decision was grounded on several English and Canadian eases
holding such conduct to amount to carrying on a business and
resulting in a use for other than residential purposes.
Although the exact question involved in the Roulet case does
not appear to have risen in this country under zoning ordinances,
several analogous situations appear in the printed decisions.
In City of Syracuse v. Snow2 the problem presented was whether
the use of a residence as a sorority house was violative of an
ordinance limiting the type of dwelling to single family dwellings
and restricting their use to only one family living together as a
single housekeeping unit. It was there decided that for the purposes of the ordinance in question the sorority was a family, the
girls living, eating, and sleeping together as a unit under the
control and supervision of a chaperon as the head of the family.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court reached a contrary result
in a case arising under a restrictive covenant in a deed limiting
the use of any house on the premises to "one single private dwelling house." The Michigan court said that a fraternity was not
a family, any resemblance between the two being superficial only,
and that the use of a residence as a fraternity house violated
the covenant.'
The case of Village of Riverside v. Reagan4 might be said to
furnish some authority for the proposition that a boarder may
be considered as part of the family residing on premises the
use of which is restricted by zoning ordinance as a dwelling for
not more than one family. Although the practice of taking in
boarders was not brought into question by the case, boarders and
and that the state may now collect all taxes which it did not collect in
reliance on the Blome and Bradley cases, i.e., sales, from materialmen to
contractors, of building materials which lose their identity. This is true
both of transactions completed before the Herlihy decision as well as transactions thereafter, because, when a prior decision is overruled, in legal contemplation it is deemed never to have existed, and hence these transactions were
taxable all the time.
1 [1937] 0. R. 912.
2 205 N. Y. S. 785 (1924).
3 Seeley v. Phi Sigma Delta House Corp., 245 Mich. 252, 222 N. W. 180
(1928).
4 270 Ill. App. 355 (1933).
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lodgers were included in the definitions of the word "family"
set out in the course of the opinion. Likewise, in Gallon v.
Hussar,5 the New York court, in determining whether a covenantor had breached a restrictive covenant by taking in boarders,
held that boarders could be considered as part of the family.
%
However, several cases arising under alleged breaches of restrictive covenants in deeds have held that the practice of taking
in boarders is contrary to the purpose of covenants which limited
the use of the premises "for the purpose of a private dwelling
or residence only,"' 6 "for residence purposes only,'' 7 or as
"a dwelling house to be used exclusively as a residence for a
private family." 8 In these cases, however, it appears that the
practice complained of was carried on to such an extent that it
might be said that the covenantors in such cases were using the
premises primarily for the business of taking in boarders or
lodgers.
The above cases furnish no standard for determining whether
a householder is forbidden by zoning ordinance or restrictive
covenant from taking in one or two close friends as boarders
or lodgers, or where the line will be drawn. In this regard, the
only satisfactory test suggested is found in Trainor v. Le Beck, 9
wherein it is stated that the true test should be whether the
premises are used primarily for the business of taking in boarders
or lodgers and only incidentally for family use, or vice versa.
This would seem to be the most satisfactory test to which this
problem is susceptible.
B. P. MORISSETTE
PERPETUITIES -

PowERs

-

DEvOLUTION

OF

PROPERTY

EXERCISE OF APPOINTMENT IS INEFECTIE.-In

WHEN

Northern Trust

Company v. Porter,1 the problem was presented to the Illinois
Supreme Court for the first time whether the period in the rule
against perpetuities is computed from the time of the creation
of a general testamentary power of appointment or from the
time of the donee's exercise thereof. In this case Mrs. Porter
was donee of a general power to appoint by will a fund bequeathed by the donor to her as trustee and life beneficiary.
Donee so appointed the fund that if the period of the rule were
5 158 N. Y. S. 895 (1916).

6 Linwood Park Co. v. Van Dusen, 63 Ohio St. 183, 58 N. E. 576 (1900).
7 Dingeman v. Boerth's Estate, 239 Mich. 234, 214 N. W. 239 (1927).
8 Sayles v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281, 96 N. E. 712, Ann. Cas. 1912D 475, 41
L. R. A. (N. S.) 625 (1911).
9 101 N. J. Eq. 823, 139 A. 16 (1927).
1 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487 (1938).
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computed from the time of the creation of the power, the appointment would be invalid, but, if the period were computed from
the time of the exercise of the power, the appointment would
be valid.
The Supreme Court decided that the period of the rule
begins to run from the time of the creation of a general testamentary power of appointment, because the donee cannot appoint
the property during his lifetime and therefore the restraint on
alienation begins with the creation of the power by donor. Since
the power was exercised in violation of the rule, and since the
court held the valid portions could not be separated from the
invalid portions of the appointment, the entire appointment
failed.
While this same problem has been the subject of a noted
controversy between Professors Gray and Kales, 2 the authorities
in this country, with apparently but one exception, agree That
the rule applied by the Illinois court in the instant case, which
is also the doctrine espoused by Gray, is the correct one.3
The opposite view is represented by the case of Miller v.
Douglass4 which holds that the period must be computed from the
time of the exercise of the general testamentary power. It is
worthy of note, however, that the Wisconsin court in that case
does not unqualifiedly oppose the majority view, but admits that
there may be cases whose facts would warrant the application
of the majority rule.
The variance in the two views arises from different conceptions of the nature of general testamentary powers. In the case
of a true general power there are no restrictions on its exercise,
either as to the appointees or the mode of appointment, and the
donee has the immediate power to constitute himself owner of
the property. The estate limited by the donor is deemed to have
vested in donee for the purpose of the rule. Hence, in such case,
the period of the rule runs from his exercise of the power. The
donee of a general power to appoint only by will cannot appoint
2 See 27 Harv. L. Rev. 705; 26 Harv. L. Rev. 64.
3 Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 17 Del. Ch. 203, 151 A. 712 (1930)
Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094 (1914) ; Minot v. Paine, 230
Mass. 514, 120 N. E. 167, 1 A. L. R. 365 (1918); St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Basset, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S. W. (2d) 569, 101 A. L. R. 1266 (1935);
Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N. J. Eq. 366, 189 A. 653
(1937); Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 143, 200 N. E. 674 (1936),
under New York statute; In re Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396,
104 A. L. R. 1345 (1936).
4 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927).
5 Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N. E. 167 at 170 (1918) ; St.'Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Basset, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S. W. (2d) 569 (1935).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

the property during his lifetime and is not regarded as
the owner
6
for the purpose of measuring the period of the rule.
:, When the Illinois court, in the principal case, decided that the
appointment had wholly failed, it was faced with the question
whether the appointive fund should pass by intestacy to the
heirs of the donee or whether it should pass in default of appointment as provided by the will of donor. This question the court
held was governed by the intention of the donee and by the
fact that the donor had made provision for disposition of the
property in default of appointment. The court decided that the
donee's act of keeping the appointive fund separated from her
own property in the will in which she exercised the power was
indicative of her intention that the property should pass under
the donor's will in default of appointment.
The general rule appears to be that where donee wholly fails
to exercise his general testamentary power of appointment the
7
appointive property devolves under the donor of the power.
This would also appear to be true where the power is ineffectually
exercised, as, for example, an appointment which violates the
rule against perpetuities s However, Illinois and Massachusetts
seem to have adopted an exception to this rule from the English
rules of law applicable to like cases.9 This exception is to the
effect that where there is an attempted exercise of a general
power, including a general testamentary power, in the absence
of provision by donor for default of appointment, the question
whether the a

rn

i iry,

will devolve as -dono's prop-

erty, or whether it will devolve as donee's property, is governed
by the intention with which donee exercised the power. The
theory is that if the primary intention of the donee in exercising
the power is to take the property out of the instrument creating
the power, that is, to make the property his own for the purpose
of devolution, and the intention to benefit the particular appointee is merely secondary, then the property will pass as the
donee's property despite the ineffective appointment. This exception apparently applies only in the absence of provision by the
donor for disposition of the property in default of appointment.' 0
6 See cases ianote 3, supra.
7 Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 143, 200 N. E. 674 (1936) ; Piegler

v. Jefferies, 128 S. C. 254, 121 S. E. 783 (1924) ; Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va.
175, 107 S. E. 751 (1921).
8 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Adams, 177 N. Y. S. 889 (1919).
9 In re Marten, [19021 1 Ch. 314; Re Boyd, [1897] 2 Ch. 232; Chatterton
v. De Lusi, Ir. L. R. 3 Eq. 232 (1879).
10 Bradford v. Andrew, 308 Ill. 458, 139 N. E. 922 (1923); Talbot v.
Riggs, 287 Mass. 144, 191 N. E. 360, 93 A. L. R. 964 (1934); Bundy v.
United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926) ; Hammond v.
Hammond, 234 Mass. 554, 125 N. E. 686 (1920).
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The foregoing illustrates the theory behihd the principal case
and behind Bradford v. Andrew, 1 which presented the converse
of the problem evolved in the principal case. There a part of the
appointive fund lapsed because of the death of an appointee, and,
in the absence of provision for default of appointment, the
question presented was whether the lapsed portion should pass
to donee's heirs or to the heirs of the donor. Because the appointive property was blended with donee's property in her will, the
court decided it was her intention to take the property out of
the instrument creating the appointment and the property
accordingly devolved through donee.
B. P. MORISSETTE
TENANCY

IN

COMMON-LEASES---RIGHT

COMMON To GRANT OIL

AND

OF ONE

TENANT

IN

GAS LEASE.-In Fyffe v. Fyffe,'

decided recently, the Illinois court affirmed its view that one
tenant in common has no authority to grant to a third person
the right to take oil and gas from the common property. In this
case Fyffe, a tenant in common with his children, individually,
and without their assent, executed an oil and gas lease to one
Wise, giving him the exclusive right to exploit the common
property. The appellant herein, an oil company, succeeded Wise
through an assignment of the lease.
Those claiming through the nonassenting children filed a bill
for partition, alleging these facts, and sought an accounting of
the oil produced. The court, after allowing an accounting, as
authorized by the statute2 in force at the time the bill was filed,
held that Fyffe had no right to execute the lease.
Recognizing a well-defined conflict of authority, 3 the court
cited Zeigler v. Brenneman4 and Murray v. Haverty5 as supporting its conclusion. In the former case the court held that a
lease such as this is valid between the lessor and the lessee even
11 See note 10, supra.
1 292 Ill. App. 539, 11 N. E. (2d) 857 (1937).
2 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1933), Ch. 2, § 1, which provides: "That where
one or more joint tenants, tenants in common or coparceners in real estate,
or any interest therein, shall take and use the profits or benefits thereof, in
greater proportion than his, her or their interest, such person or persons, his,
her, or their executors and administrators, shall account therefor to his or
their cotenant, jointly or severally."
3 Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F. (2d) 566, 40 A. L. R. 1389
(1924) ; Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okl. 86, 27 P. (2d)
855, 91 A. L. R. 188 (1933) ; Riddle v. Ellis, 139 Okl. 68, 281 P. 286 (1929);
York v. Warren Oil & Gas Co., 191 Ky. 157, 229 S. W. 114 (1921).
4 237 Ill. 15, 86 N. E. 597 (1908).
5 70 Ill. 318 (1873).
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while the premises remain undivided6 but is void as to the
grantor's cotenants; that is, in the determination of their rights,
no consideration will be given to the existence of that lease.
Such a lease or license will not, therefore, bind a non-assenting,
non-joining cotenant.7 There are cases holding that, inasmuch
as the owner of an undivided half interest in oil and gas lands
has not the right to exploit the common property without the
consent of his cotenants, he cannot confer any greater right upon
his lessee. 8 This problem is as old as the Roman Law.9
Petroleum oil in its place in the land is part of the land just
as coal, lumber, and other minerals, and equity will enjoin its
unlawful removal.10 It has accordingly been held that it is waste
by a tenant in common to exploit the common property for gas
and oil to the exclusion of his co-owners, and he is held accountable to them in their pro rata shares."1
Supporting the view contrary to that adopted in Illinois, the
Oklahoma court12 has held that the lessee becomes for the time
being a tenant in common with the lessor's cotenants and is
entitled to the same rights that his lessor had, even to entering
the premises to exploit, produce, and market the oil and gas
obtained. His only obligation is to render an accounting to his
cotenants.18
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, and upon precedents, the
Illinois court was firm in stating its conclusion in the Fyffe case
6 See also Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
in Freevnan v. Egnuor, 72 W. Va. 830, 79 S.E.824 (1913), the court said:
"Of course, to be effectual in the sense that the lessee may enter on and
operate the premises for the production of gas and oil, all the cotenants must
join. A lease by one only does not warrant such entry and production.
Those not joining may restrain the lessee from entering for the purpose of
operating thereunder without their consent." Accord, Gulf Refining Co. v.
Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
7 Tipping v. Robbins, 71 Wis. 507, 37 N. W. 427 (1888); Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. v. Sandlin, 173 Mo. App. 384, 158 S.W. 857 (1913);

Murray v. Haverty, 70 II1. 318 (1873).
8 Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919) ; Freeman
v. Egnor, 72 W. Va. 830, 79 S.E. 824 (1913).
9 Dig. L. 28, Communi Dividundo.
10 Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271, 36 L. R. A. 566
(1896); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411, 38 L. R. A. 694

(1897).
11 Williamson v. Jones, supra note 10; Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co.,
80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472 (1917). But see Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v.
Walsen, 4 Cal. (2d) 637, 52 P. (2d) 237 (1935), stating contrary view.
12 Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F. (2d) 566, 40 A. L. R. 1389
(1924) ; Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P. (2d)
855, 91 A. L. R. 188 (1933) ; Riddle v. Ellis, 139 Okla. 68, 281 P. 286 (1929).
18 York v. Warren Oil and Gas Co., 191 Ky. 157, 229 S. W. 114 (1921).
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notwithstanding the obvious conflict of views as expressed by
other courts.
F. J. NOvoNY
WILLS - CONDITIONAL WILLS - AmBIGUOUS EXPRESSION OF
TESTATOR To BE GIVEN EFFECT AS CONDITIONAL OR ABSOLUTE

WILL.-The recently decided case of Barber v. Barber' is the
first case in which the Illinois Supreme Court has expressed itself
with reference to the doctrine of conditional wills.2 In this case,
the testator, contemplating a train trip to Buffalo, New York,
executed the following instrument: "I am leaving for New York
State this morning, and if anything should happen to me, I
request that everything I own, both personal and Real, be given
to my sister, Miss May Barber (petitioner)." This instrument
was validly executed and attested. The evidence further showed
that the testator returned from his trip alive and well, resumed
his normal employment, and died a year later from natural
causes. The petitioner then offered this above document for
probate as the testator's last will and testament. The contestant resisted the probate on the grounds that it was a conditional will, and the condition (namely, the testator's death at
some time during his then contemplated trip) not having taken
place, the will was void and inoperative. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and admitted the
will to probate, holding that the will was absolute and not conditional and that therefore it came into full force and effect at
the testator's death.
The Illinois court in its decision adopts several rules of construction which are supported by a majority of the courts. In
general the policy of the law is to construe wills to be absolute
rather than conditional. 3 The courts hold uniformly that to
render a will conditional its language must clearly and unequivocally express the testator's intention that the will should
operate only upon a certain contingency. 4 Moreover, courts are
not inclined to hold a will conditional where it can reasonably
be construed as having been absolute even though under a strict
Ill. 215, 13 N. E. (2d) 257 (1938).
While the earlier case of American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N. E. 843 (1928), does mention contingent wills,
the reference is only dicta in the case.
3 68 C. J. 630, § 256; 28 R. C. L. § 121, and cases there cited.
4 1 Schouler on Wills, Executors, and Administrators (5th ed.), § 285.
See also 11 A. L. R. 832 and 79 A. L. R. 1163.
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construction the language used might import a condition. 5
Adopting these rules of construction, the court points out that
the approach to the problem is highly factual and that the result
is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of each
case. 6 In general, it can be said that if the expressed condition is
by way of an inducement, explaining why the will was then
written, the will is absolute. 7 But if the contingency referred to
in the will is the reason for making such a particular disposition
of the property and is in its terms a condition precedent to the
will's operation, the will is conditional.8
Guided by these well settled rules of construction, the court in
the instant case reached a conclusion that is manifestly sound.9
It is more reasonable to believe that the testator's contemplated
trip was merely the reason for writing the will and not the reason
for the particular distribution provided for. The will merely
reads, "If anything should happen to me, I request that everything, etc ... ." To construe a condition into this language is to
5 Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411, 24 S. Ct. 487, 48 L. Ed. 730 (1904) ;
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 45 S. W. (2d) 1096 (1931); In re
Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 66 A. 92 (1907).
6 Whether the will is contingent or absolute in any given case depends
upon the individual testator's intention. This latter will necessarily vary
with the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
7 Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S.W. 800, 11 A. L. R. 832 (1919);
In re Tinsley's Will, 187 Iowa 23, 174 N. W. 4 (1919); McMerriman v.
Schiel, 108 Ohio St. 334, 140 N. E. 600 (1923).
8 Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589, 56 Am. Rep. 908 (1885); Cody v.
Conly. 27 Grat. (Va.) 313; Davis v. Davis. 107 Miss. 245. 65 So. 241 (1914).
9 In the leading case of Eaton v. Brown, supra, in which the conditional
language was even stronger than in the instant case, Mr. Justice Holmes
held the will to be absolute. The will in that case read, "I am going on a
Journey, and may not ever return. And if I do not, this is my last request."
In the case of Ferguson v. Ferguson, supra, the will read, "I am going on a

journey and I may never come back alive so I make this Will, but I expect
to make changes if I live." The Texas Supreme Court held this to be an
absolute will. In the case of In re Poonarian's Will, 234 N. Y. 329, 137 N. E.
606 (1922), the court held the will to be contingent, but it contained the
express condition, "if anything Happen to me in Constantinople or in ocean."
In the case of In re Tinsley's Will, supra, where the testator, about to
start on a journey, wrote that "in case of any serious accident" certain
things were to be done, the court held the will to be absolute. In the case
of Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 174, 9 L. Ed. 91 (1835), in which the
will read, "Being about to travel a considerable distance, and knowing the
uncertainty of life . . . do make this my last will and testament," and the

court held the will to be absolute. In McMerriman v. Schiel, supra, note 7,
in which the will read, "In case that I meet with accident on this journey,"
the court held the will to be absolute. And in the case of In re Forquer's
Estate, supra, in which the will read, "should anything befall me while
away or that I should die," the court held the will to be absolute. In all
these cases, and there are many more along the same lines, the courts felt
that the apparent condition in the language was merely a narrative explaining why the will was then written.
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interpolate by inference the words, "while during this trip," into
the instrument. This the court properly refused to do. If it was
the intention of the testator that the will be inoperative unless he
died during the contemplated trip, he should have made this
intention clear by express language.
B. FELDMAN

